ANNEX 6 - LINK'S ECONOMIC AND INTEREST RATE FORECAST (ISSUED BY LINK ON 10 NOVEMBER 2021)

1. The council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link provided the following forecasts on 8th November 2021. These are forecasts for certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80 bps.

Link Group Interest Rate View	8.11.21													
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
3 month ave earnings	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6 month ave earnings	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10
12 month ave earnings	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
5 yr PWLB	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40
25 yr PWLB	2.10	2.20	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.70	2.70
50 yr PWLB	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50

2. *Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -*

- *LIBOR and LIBID rates will cease from the end of 2021. Work is currently progressing to replace LIBOR with a rate based on SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average). In the meantime, Link's forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.*

- *Link's forecasts for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short term cash at any one point in time.*

3. The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings.

   As shown in the forecast table above, Link's forecast for Bank Rate now includes five increases, one in December 2021 to 0.25%, then quarter 2 of 2022 to 0.50%, quarter 1 of 2023 to 0.75%, quarter 1 of 2024 to 1.00% and, finally, one in quarter 1 of 2025 to 1.25%.

4. **Significant risks to the forecasts**

- **Labour and supply shortages** prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity.

- **Mutations** of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed, resulting in further national lockdowns or severe regional restrictions.

- **The Monetary Policy Committee** acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than Link currently anticipates.

- **The Monetary Policy Committee** tightens monetary policy too late to ward off building inflationary pressures.

- **The Government** acts too quickly to cut expenditure to balance the national budget.

- **UK / EU trade arrangements** – if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of cooperation in sorting out significant remaining issues.

- **German general election** in September 2021. Germany faces months of uncertainty while a new coalition government is cobbled together after the indecisive result of the election. Once that coalition is formed, Angela Merkel's tenure as Chancellor will end and will leave a hole in overall EU leadership.

- **Longer term US treasury yields** rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.

- **Major stock markets** e.g., in the US, become increasingly judged as being over-valued and susceptible to major price corrections. Central banks become increasingly exposed to the "moral hazard" risks of having to buy shares and corporate bonds to reduce the impact of major financial market sell-offs on the general economy.

- **Geo-political risks,** for example in Iran, North Korea, but also in Europe and Middle Eastern countries; on-going global power influence struggles between Russia/China/US. These could lead to increasing safe-haven flows.

5. The balance of risks to the UK economy: -

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including residual risks from Covid and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

6. Forecasts for Bank Rate

Link does not expect that Bank Rate will go up fast after the initial rate rise as the supply potential of the economy is not likely to have taken a major hit during the pandemic: it should, therefore, be able to cope well with meeting demand after supply shortages subside over the next year, without causing inflation to remain elevated in the medium-term, or to inhibit inflation from falling back towards the MPC's 2% target after the spike up to around 5%. The forecast includes five increases in Bank Rate over the three-year forecast period to March 2025, ending at 1.25%. However, it is likely that these forecasts will need changing within a relatively short timeframe for the following reasons: -

- There are increasing grounds for viewing the economic recovery as running out of steam during the summer and now into the autumn. This could lead into stagflation which would create a dilemma for the MPC as to whether to focus on combating inflation or supporting economic growth through keeping interest rates low.

- Will some current key supply shortages spill over into causing economic activity in some sectors to take a significant hit?
- Rising gas and electricity prices in October and next April and increases in other prices caused by supply shortages and increases in taxation next April, are already going to deflate consumer spending power without the MPC having to take any action on Bank Rate to cool inflation.
- On the other hand, consumers are sitting on over £160bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so when will they spend this sum, in part or in total?
- It is estimated that there were around 1 million people who came off furlough at the end of September; how many of those would not have had jobs on 1st October and would therefore be available to fill labour shortages which are creating a major headache in many sectors of the economy? So, supply shortages which have been driving up both wages and costs, could reduce significantly within the next six months or so and alleviate one of the MPC's key current concerns.
- Link also recognises there could be further nasty surprises on the Covid front, on top of the flu season this winter, and even the possibility of another lockdown, which could all depress economic activity.
- If the UK invokes article 16 of the Brexit deal over the dislocation in trading arrangements with Northern Ireland, this has the potential to end up in a no deal Brexit.

In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, it is likely that these forecasts will be revised again over the next few months - in line with what the new news is.

It should also be borne in mind that Bank Rate being cut to 0.10% was an emergency measure to deal with the Covid crisis hitting the UK in March 2020. At any time, the MPC could decide to simply take away that final emergency cut from 0.25% to 0.10% on no other grounds than it being no longer being warranted and as a step forward in the return to normalisation. In addition, any Bank Rate under 1% is both highly unusual and highly supportive of economic growth.

7. Forecasts for PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is likely to be a steady rise over the forecast period, with some degree of uplift due to rising treasury yields in the US.

There is likely to be **exceptional volatility and unpredictability in respect of gilt yields and PWLB rates** due to the following factors: -

- How strongly will changes in gilt yields be correlated to changes in US treasury yields (see below). Over 10 years since 2011 there has been an average 75% correlation between movements in US treasury yields and gilt yields. However, from time to time these two yields can diverge. Lack of spare economic capacity and rising inflationary pressures are viewed as being much greater dangers in the US than in the UK. This could mean that central bank rates will end up rising earlier and higher in the US than in the UK if inflationary pressures were to escalate; the consequent increases in treasury yields could well spill over to cause (lesser) increases in gilt yields. There is, therefore, an upside risk to forecasts for gilt yields due to this correlation. The Link Group forecasts have included a risk of a 75% correlation between the two yields.
- Will the Fed (Federal Reserve) take action to counter increasing treasury yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- Would the MPC act to counter increasing gilt yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?

- How strong will inflationary pressures actually turn out to be in both the US and the UK and so put upward pressure on treasury and gilt yields?
- How will central banks implement their new average or sustainable level inflation monetary policies?
- How well will central banks manage the withdrawal of Quantitative Easing (QE) purchases of their national bonds i.e., without causing a panic reaction in financial markets as happened in the “taper tantrums” in the US in 2013?
- Will exceptional volatility be focused on the short or long-end of the yield curve, or both?

The forecasts are also predicated on an assumption that there is no break-up of the Eurozone or EU within the forecasting period, despite the major challenges that are looming up, and that there are no major ructions in international relations, especially between the US and China / North Korea and Iran, which have a major impact on international trade and world GDP growth.

8. Gilt and treasury yields

Since the start of 2021, there has been a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PWLB rates. During the first part of the year, US President Biden’s, and the Democratic party’s, determination to push through a $1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the Covid pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. However, this was in addition to the $900bn support package already passed in December 2020. This was then followed by additional Democratic ambition to spend $1trn on infrastructure, which has just been passed by both houses, and an even larger sum on an American families plan over the next decade; this is still caught up in Democrat / Republican haggling. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus was happening at a time when: -

1. A fast vaccination programme has enabled a rapid opening up of the economy.
2. The economy has been growing strongly during 2021.
3. It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries.
4. And the Fed was still providing stimulus through monthly QE purchases.

These factors could cause an excess of demand in the economy which could then unleash strong inflationary pressures. This could then force the Fed to take much earlier action to start increasing the Fed rate from near zero, despite their stated policy being to target average inflation.

9. At its 3rd November Fed meeting, the Fed decided to make a start on tapering QE purchases with the current $80bn per month of Treasury securities to be trimmed by $10bn in November and a further $10bn in December. The $40bn of MBS (mortgage-backed securities) purchases per month will be trimmed by $5bn in each month. If the run-down continued at that pace, the purchases would cease entirely next June but the Fed has reserved the ability to adjust purchases up or down. This met market expectations. These purchases are currently acting as downward pressure on treasury yields and so it would be expected that Treasury yields would rise as a consequence over the taper period, all other things being equal. However, on the inflation front it was still insisting that the surge in inflation was "largely" transitory. In his post-meeting press conference, Chair Jerome Powell claimed that “the drivers of higher inflation have been predominantly connected to the dislocations caused by the pandemic” and argued that the Fed’s tools cannot address supply constraints. However, with the Fed now placing major emphasis on its mandate for ensuring full employment, (besides containing inflation), at a time when employment has fallen by 5 million and 3 million have left the workforce, resignations have surged due to the ease of getting better paid jobs and so wage pressures have built rapidly.

10. With wage growth at its strongest since the early 1980s, inflation expectations rising and signs of a breakout in cyclical price inflation, particularly rents, the FOMC's (Federal Open Market Committee) insistence that this is still just a temporary shock "related to the pandemic and the reopening of the economy", does raise doubts which could undermine market confidence in the Fed and lead to higher treasury yields.

11. As the US financial markets are, by far, the biggest financial markets in the world, any upward trend in treasury yields will invariably impact and influence financial markets in other countries. Inflationary pressures and erosion of surplus economic capacity look much stronger in the US compared to those in the UK, which would suggest that Fed rate increases eventually needed to suppress inflation, are likely to be faster and stronger than Bank Rate increases in the UK. This is likely to put upward pressure on treasury yields which could then spill over into putting upward pressure on UK gilt yields.

12. The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates: -

- There is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

13. A new era – a fundamental shift in central bank monetary policy

One of the key results of the pandemic has been a fundamental rethinking and shift in monetary policy by major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB (European Central Bank), to tolerate a higher level of inflation than in the previous two decades when inflation was the prime target to bear down on so as to stop it going above a target rate. There is now also a greater emphasis on other targets for monetary policy than just inflation, especially on 'achieving broad and inclusive "maximum" employment in its entirety' in the US, before consideration would be given to increasing rates.

- The Fed in America has gone furthest in adopting a monetary policy based on a clear goal of allowing the inflation target to be symmetrical (rather than a ceiling to keep under), so that inflation averages out the dips down and surges above the target rate, over an unspecified period of time.
- The Bank of England has also amended its target for monetary policy so that inflation should be 'sustainably over 2%' before starting on raising Bank Rate and the ECB now has a similar policy.
- ***For local authorities, this means that investment interest rates and very short term PWLB rates will not be rising as quickly or as high as in previous decades when the economy recovers from a downturn and the recovery eventually runs out of spare capacity to fuel continuing expansion.***
- Labour market liberalisation since the 1970s has helped to break the wage-price spirals that fuelled high levels of inflation and has now set inflation on a lower path which makes this shift in monetary policy practicable. In addition, recent changes in flexible employment practices, the rise of the gig economy and technological changes, will all help to lower inflationary pressures.
- Governments will also be concerned to see interest rates stay lower as every rise in central rates will add to the cost of vastly expanded levels of national debt; (in the UK this is £21bn for each 1% rise in rates). On the other hand, higher levels of inflation will help to erode the real value of total public debt.

14. Investment and borrowing rates

- **Investment returns** are expected to improve in 2022-23. However, while markets are pricing in a series of Bank Rate hikes, actual economic circumstances may see the MPC fall short of these elevated expectations.

- **Borrowing interest rates** fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England and still remain at historically low levels. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.

- On 25.11.20, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates which had been increased by 100 bps (basis points) in October 2019. The standard and certainty margins were reduced by 100 bps but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three-year capital programme. The current margins over gilt yields are as follows: -.

▪ **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)

▪ **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)

▪ **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)

▪ **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)

▪ **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

- Borrowing for capital expenditure. Link's long-term (beyond 10 years) forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%. As some PWLB certainty rates are currently below 2.00%, there remains value in considering long-term borrowing from the PWLB where appropriate. Temporary borrowing rates are likely, however, to remain near Bank Rate and may also prove attractive as part of a balanced debt portfolio. In addition, there are also some cheap alternative sources of long-term borrowing if an authority is seeking to avoid a "cost of carry" but also wishes to mitigate future re-financing risk.

- While authorities may not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure, to replace maturing debt and the rundown of reserves, there will be a *cost of carry*, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances.